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Abstract 
  Arab countries, being incapable to significantly benefit from the surge of 
global FDI, seem to benefit more from intraregional FDI recently fuelled by the 
massive surpluses in oil producing countries. The need to understand the 
determinants of intra Arab FDI is highlighted using an augmented gravity model 
based on panel data of 17 Arab countries over the period 1998-2007. Basic gravity 
model explains part of the FDI variations, however when accounting for country 
heterogeneity the fit of the model increases considerably. Intra Arab FDI is very 
erratic and unevenly distributed between countries. Total bilateral trade and proximity 
in terms of distance, border and business language are very significant due to FDI 
concentration within GCC area. Investment freedom encourages FDI inflows, despite 
the fact that other aspects of economic freedom are negatively related to FDI inflows. 
This probably due to the fact that countries encourage foreign and Arab investments 
through specific laws. Likewise, infrastructure quality negatively affects Arab 
intraregional FDI likely because it is widely directed to infrastructure services and in 
countries with poor performance in this sector. Results are disappointing with regard 
to institutional variables likely due to similarities between source and host countries. 
Investment and fiscal treaties are not relevant and control of corruption was found to 
negatively related to investments. Investors, used to deal with corruption in their own 
countries, probably do not regard it as a severe constraint to investments. Inversely, 
quality of regulatory environment is shown to positively affect intraregional FDI, 
indicating what should be done in terms of improving business environment, 
controlling corruption and risks as well as deepening cooperation. 
  
ﲏﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺮﺷﺎﺒﳌﺍ ﱯﻨﺟﻷﺍ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺪﳏ   ﻲﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ  
ﺺﺨﻠﹸﻣ  
 
   ﺝﺫﻮﳕ ﺮﻳﻮﻄﺘﺑ ﺎﻨﻤﻗ ﺎﻨ￿ﺈﻓ ،ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺾﺋﺍﻮﻔﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ ﺀﺍﺮﺟ ﺓﺪﻳﺍﺰﺘﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺩﺪﳏ ﻢﻬﻔﻟ
 ـﻟ ﻊﺳﻮﻣ ﺔﻴﺑﺫﺎﺟ 17  ﺓﱰﻔﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻋ ﺔﻟﻭﺩ  2007‐1998  . ًﺍﺀﺰﺟ ﺮﺴﻔﺗ ﺔﻴﺑﺫﺎﳉﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﻐﺘﻣ ﻥﺃ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﲑﺸﺗ  ﰲ ﺕﺍﲑﻐﺘﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ ًﺎﻄﻴﺴﺑ 
 ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺎﻣ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﺲ￿ﺎﲡ ﻡﺪﻋ ﺭﺎﺒﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﲔﻌﺑ ﺬﺧﺄﻳ ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ ﺓﺪﺸﺑ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﲑﺴﻔﺗ ﺓﻮﻗ ﻊﻔﺗﺮﺗﻭ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ
ﻥﺍﺪﻠﺒﻟﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺎﻣ ﻭﺎﺴﺘﻣ ﲑﻏ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ ﺔﻋﺯﻮﻣﻭ ﺓﺮﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﲑﻏ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻷ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ  .  ﺏﺮﻘﻟﺍ ﺲﻜﻌﺗ ﱵﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﻐﺘﳌﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺎﻤﻛ
 ﻞﺜﻣ ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﲔﺑ ﺎﻣ ﺎﻫﺰﻛﺮﺗ ﺔﺠﻴﺘ￿ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﰲ ﺮﺛﺆﺗ ﻝﺎﻤﻋﻷﺍ ﺔﻐﻟﻭ ﺔﻛﱰﺸﳌﺍ ﺩﻭﺪﳊﺍﻭ ﺔﻓﺎﺴﳌﺍ  .  ﻥﺃ
 ﻩﺬﲠ ًﺎﻴﺒﻠﺳ ﺔﻄﺒﺗﺮﻣ ﻯﺮﺧﻷﺍ ﺔﻳﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺔﻳﺮﳊﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﻐﺘﻣ ﻥﺃ ﻦﻣ ﻢﻏﺮﻟﺎﺑ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺗ ﻦﻣ ﺪﻳﺰﺗ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻳﺮﺣ
ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ  . ﺕﻭﺎﻔﺗ ﱃﺇ ﻊﺟﺮﻳ ﺍﺬﻫﻭ   ﺕﺎﺣﻼﺻﻹﺍ  ﺔﻬﺟﻮﻣ ﺔﺻﺎﺧ ﺕﺎﻌﻳﺮﺸﺗ ﺩﻮﺟﻮﻟﻭ ،ﻝﺎﳌﺍﻭ ﻝﺎﻤﻋﻷﺍﻭ ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﺎﻄﻗ ﲔﺑ ﺎﻣ 
ﺐ￿ﺎﺟﻷﺍ ﻝﺎﻤﻋﻷﺍ ﻝﺎﺟﺮﻟ  .  ﻩﺬﻫ ﻪﺟﻮﺘﻟ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﺸﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺎﺑ ًﺎﺒﻠﺳ ﺔﻄﺒﺗﺮﻣ ﺔﻴﺘﺤﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻋﻮ￿ ﻥﺈﻓ ﻝﺎﳊﺍ ﻚﻟﺬﻛﻭ
ﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺫ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺕﺍﺭﺎﻘﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﺕﺎﻣﺪﳋﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﺎﻄﻗ ﰲ ﺰﻛﺮﻣ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺍ ﺎﲠ ﺽﻮﻬﻨﻟﺍ ﻞﺟﺃ ﻦﻣ ﺔﻴ￿ﺪﺘﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﺘﺤﺘ  .  ﻥﺃ ﺎﻤﻛ
 ﻥﻷ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ ﺔﻠﺒﻘﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻴﺴﺳﺆﳌﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺕﺍﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﲔﺑ ﺎﻣ ﺐﺟﻮﻣ ﻂﺑﺍﺮﺗ ﺩﻮﺟﻭ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻝﺪﺗ ﻻ ﺔﻴﺴﺳﺆﳌﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﻐﺘﻣ
ﻞﺻﻷﺍ ﻝﻭﺩ ﻦﻣ ﻦﺴﺣﺃ ﻥﻮﻜﺗ ﺪﻗ ﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣ ﺕﺎﻳﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﺎﳍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ  . ﺕﺎﻴﻗﺎﻔﺗﻻﺍ ﺔﻳﻮﻨﻌﻣ ﻡﺪﻋ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻝﺪﺗ ﺮﻳﺪﻘﺘﻟﺍ ﺞﺋﺎﺘ￿  
ﺎﻬﻠﻴﻌﻔﺗ ﻡﺪﻌﻟ ﺎﲟﺭ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ ﺔﻴﺒﻳﺮﻀﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ  .  ﲔﺑ ﻪﻴﺸﻔﺘﻟ ﻚﻟﺫﻭ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺘﻟﺎﺑ ًﺎﺒﻠﺳ ﻂﺒﺗﺮﻣ ﻱﺭﺍﺩﻹﺍ ﺩﺎﺴﻔﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺎﻤﻛ
ﺔﻴﻠﺻﻷﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻠﺒﻘﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ  . ﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ًﺎﺑﺎﳚﺇ ﺮﺛﺆﺗ ﺔﻴﻤﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻋﻮ￿ ﻥﺃ ﺪﺟﻭ ﻞﺑﺎﻘﳌﺎﺑ  .  ﻝﺪﺗ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ
ﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ  ﻱﺭﺍﺩﻹﺍ ﺩﺎﺴﻔﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻢﻜﺤﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﻝﺎﻤﻋﻷﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺑ ﲔﺴﲢ ﻝﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻘﻓﺪﺗ ﻊﻓﺭ ﻊﻴﻄﺘﺴﺗ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌ
ﺕﺍﺭﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﻂﺒﺜﺗ ﱵﻟﺍ ﺮﻃﺎﺨﳌﺍ ﻞﻴﻠﻘﺗﻭ .  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Arab countries are facing daunting development challenges culminated 
in persistent high unemployment, volatile and elusive economic growth. Most 
countries are implementing reform policies that aim to accelerate growth, 
diversify the economy and consolidate the export base by encouraging more 
private investments albeit local or foreign
(1). The recent surge of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries due to global ramifications 
opened a window for developing countries to attract more funds in order to 
finance development. Most developing countries responded by offering even 
more liberal and attractive, profitable business environment. FDI flows to 
developing countries was even attracted by the wave of privatization of 
industrial public sector firms and the dismantling of barriers to entry in the 
services sector. Competition for global FDI is very tough and Arab countries 
did not manage well because global capital regards the region as "risk prone" 
and has a relatively bad business environment coupled with a slow reform 
pace, specially in the process of privatization and in lowering  barriers to entry 
in the services sector. As such Arab countries attracted little investment and 
did not benefit from the global surge of FDI.  
 
The spectacular increase of oil prices since the end of the nineties and 
the accumulation of considerable surpluses in the Arab oil rich countries 
spurred huge windfalls looking for safe and high return. Traditionally these 
surpluses are recycled in the global financial system as it happened during the 
oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979. Given the fact that this later oil shock  
coincided with low interest return in the global money markets, and very 
volatile equity markets as well as high scrutiny on funds from the regions 
imposed by the imperative to fight "global terrorism" and the fact that most 
Arab countries are reaching out for more FDI by offering more stable and 
better business environments than before. All these factors combined might 
encourage more intra Arab FDI flows.  
 
This paper tries to understand what determine Arab intraregional FDI 
flows. Conventional wisdom based mostly on evidence from augmented 
gravity models stipulates that FDI flows are determined by market size, 
purchasing power, distance and factors of similarity, and probably more 
importantly the quality of the business and investment environment. The 
overwhelming literature on FDI in the region, surveyed in the next section, is 
based on total country flows. Most of the published work  tries to understand 
either what economic and institutional factors determine total FDI inflows 
from the world to a particular country, or to study the impact of FDI inflows 
on economic activity. This paper depart from this strand of research by 
looking at intra Arab FDI flows and try to understand the motives for Arabs 
governments and businessmen investing within the region. A consistent 
database of FDI flows and a host of explanatory variables was compiled from 
1998 to 2007. An augmented gravity model based on panel data for 17 Arab 
countries is used to benchmark intra Arab investment behavior. The results 
show that simple gravity model explains parts of the investments flows and 
  2distance between countries is very relevant. As most investment flows goes 
from oil rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
(2) countries  to other Arab 
countries and also within GCC, a dummy variable was found very significant. 
Border and language dummies also explains part of the investment flows. A 
composite index for the quality of infrastructure was found to be negatively 
and significantly related with investment flows reflecting the fact that 
investment opportunities  are more offered in countries that are in need to 
upgrade infrastructure. We found that total trade flows are strongly related to 
investment flows, however economic freedom is not a strong impediment to 
attracting FDI as most government have special regulations with regards to 
FDI. We tested a large strand of variables that reflect the quality of institutions 
and the regulatory framework. The picture that emerges that Arab investors do 
not particularly regards the region a risk prone probably because of home 
biased effect or have better knowledge of the region which leads them to 
assess risk differently.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Arab 
intraregional FDI trends over 1998-2007 period. In Section 3 we briefly 
survey the literature on FDI in the region and discuss gravity modeling. 
Section 4 highlights data sources and some summary statistics of the variables 
used in our empirical work. Empirical results are presented in Section 5 . 
Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Arab intraregional FDI trends 
 
Global FDI witnessed a rapid increase during the last decade, however 
it is heavily unevenly distributed. According to UNCTAD database, by the 
end of 2007 total FDI inflows and outflows reached respectively 1833 and 
1996 billions of US dollars (Table 1). This represent 160% and 190% increase 
over the last 10 years. America and Europe are the main  recipient and source 
countries with more than 75% and 84% of inward and outward FDI in 2007. 
Asia comes third with an increasing FDI inflows of about 20%, although it 
provided only 14% of total FDI outflows. Although FDI inflows to Arab 
countries increased dramatically in recent years, from 5.5 to 72.4 billions of 
US dollars over ten years, they remain relatively very limited. Their 
proportion of global FDI inflows did not exceed 4% in 2007, which is slightly 
higher than that going to Africa or Oceania. Thus, the efforts undertaken to 
create a better business environment and overcome deficiencies aiming at 
enhancing their attractiveness remain far from complete. With regards to FDI 
outflows, Arab countries come far behind Europe, America and Asia. Their 
FDI outflows ranged erratically from -0.4% to a maximum of 2.16% in 2007. 
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At the country level, Saudi Arabia and UAE are the largest host 
destinations among Arab countries both of them attracting more than 51% of 
total Arab FDI inflows in 2007. In fact Arab intraregional FDI is very 
concentrated and Gini coefficient was around 0.7 over the period from 1998 to 
2007. These two countries in addition to Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain account 
for more than 94% of  FDI outwards in 2007 (Appendixes A and B). Table 2 
presents Arab intraregional FDI flows over 1998-2007 period. It is worth to 
mention some notable findings by simply reading this table. On average, 
intraregional FDI flows account for 36 % of FDI inflows to Arab region. FDI 
inflows to Arab countries from outside the region still account for almost two 
third of the inflows. The low penetration of Arab FDI can be explained by a 
concentration within the GCC countries and a concentration of Arab investors 
on  sectors that may have shorter return horizons such as services and real 
estate. In 2007 Arab investments in industry and agriculture accounted only 
for 18% of total Arab FDI. Arab FDI inflows are very erratic but tend to grow 
dramatically over the period, especially from 2001 to 2006. Greater 
intraregional FDI flows are certainly driven by the excess of domestic 
liquidity never reached before, resulting from high oil prices and repatriated 
Arab money since September 11. Thus, some Arab countries started to invest 
more intensively in other Arab countries, which offsets the low level of 
attractiveness of Arab countries in the eyes of large foreign investors. This 
new trend is of a great benefit to Arab countries especially those suffering 
from a low saving and investment rates. This can be viewed as a beginning 
that needs to be reinforced. That's why it is so important to try to bring more 
light on the economic, geographical and regulatory factors involved in the 
intraregional investment decision. Their analysis could then help address the 
gaps and strengthen the drivers of intraregional FDI. 
 
Table 2: Arab Intraregional FDI outward (US Dollars at current prices in millions) 
 
  1998  2000  2001  2002  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Total Intraregional FDI  2193.2  2271.532  2447.4  2912.34  5898.5  38006.7  17573.7  15959.6  
Intraregional FDI to total 
Inflows to the region  39.53  38.13  26.24  34.84  23.87  83.12  26.01  22.05  
Intraregional FDI to total 
Outflows of the region  -  99.13  373.73  94.89  83.68  329.41  78.39  36.92  
 
Source : Authors calculations From  UNCTAD database.  
 
3. Modeling Arab Intraregional Investment Flows  
 
Most of the empirical  research work on FDI to the region was carried 
out on total country inflows using panel data models. Bilateral investment 
flows within or outside the region  is grossly neglected probably because the 
lack of easily accessible data . Most of the published work looked at the 
determinants of FDI and what explains the relatively low attractiveness of the 
region of foreign investments. Other papers looked at the impact of FDI on 
growth and economic development. The picture that emerges from this 
research is not clear cut and the implications for a policy receipt is even more 
fuzzy. For example Onyeiuw (2008) found that FDI inflows to the MENA 
region are not related investments in  human capital and in technology. Given the difficulty of measuring human capital and technology in the region due to 
serious data limitations it is very difficult to conclude that these factors are not 
relevant to FDI. For Sekkat and Varoudakis (2004) trade and exchange 
liberalization, infrastructure availability and sound economic and political 
conditions help increase FDI. However this does not answer why the region is 
not FDI attractive despite good macroeconomic framework and progress in 
liberalization in certain Arab countries. Arab Mediterranean countries engaged 
in Euro Med agreements in order to bolster trade and FDI. In fact as pointed 
out by Ouali (2006) the establishment of a free trade area with the EU 
probably would not boost FDI as  European companies have no more pressure 
to enter Southern markets in the absence of trade barriers, and also in the 
context of an expanding Union to the East where competition for FDI is even 
tighter, and as pointed out by Martin (2000) such partnership agreements have 
no special provision for FDI which may create investment diversion not 
induce it. However Favara (2006) argued that weak FDI and strong imports 
from Europe and low exports to Europe is due to the lack of reforms not to 
trade and investment substitution. In fact Arab countries aiming to attract 
European FDI should learn form East European experience in terms of 
regulations and use investment diplomacy as a tool to attract more FDI 
(Zukrowska et al , 2006).      
 
The question that FDI attractiveness is related to having strong 
infrastructure needs some clarification. Most countries looking for more FDI 
are also hoping that it contributes to the economic and social development of 
the country by investing in infrastructure projects. However, multinationals 
allocate FDI to regions where return is highest which is heavily impacted by 
the quality of infrastructure. Sekkat (2002) found a positive relation between 
the quality backbone services and FDI inflows to some Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries. The real question is then how to boost investment 
in infrastructure in order to make the country more FDI attractive. First 
countries should direct their resources to invest in infrastructure and operate 
reforms in the services sector in order to attract private investment.  Also,  
countries could encourage investing in infrastructure through modern mode of 
finance that establish a partnership between public and private sector such as 
BOT and BOOT projects.  
 
    Many authors argued the importance of stable macroeconomic 
environment in attracting FDI. Kamaly (2006) found that FDI response to 
macroeconomic fundamentals is very sluggish stressing the long term impact 
of  macroeconomic policy. Also Jallab et al (2008) found that macroeconomic 
stability is essential to translate the impact of FDI on economic growth. Nicet-
Chenaf (2007) also found that FDI exerts a positive impact on growth 
although through employment and value added and less through spillover 
effects of technological transfers.   
 
Many papers looked at the impact of quality institutions on FDI flows. 
Bad institutions and governance are thought to deter FDI and increase the risk 
averse of investors. Marani (2006) using World bank governance indicators 
developed by Kraay et al (2005) found that institutions play a significant role 
in investment attractiveness of countries. Alessandrini (2000) concentrated on 
  6the role of legislation and regulation that directly manage FDI inflows. Sarisoy 
et al (2007) argued that FDI type (vertical or horizontal) depends of political 
regime. He found that autocracies are likely to receive relatively more vertical 
FDI, whereas democracies are more likely to receive  more horizontal FDI.  
 
In this paper we try to explain inter-Arab investment flows
(3) using an 
augmented gravity model based on both standard gravity variables (distance, 
income and population, congruity and other dummies) of both sending and 
receiving countries, as well as on a set of variables specific to cross border 
investment flows using panel data of 17 Arab countries
(4) covering 10 annual 
periods from 1998 to 2007.  
 
The gravity model was initially introduced in economics by Tinbergen 
(1962) and first tested by Pöyhönen (1963) and Linnemann (1966) by analogy 
to Newton's law of gravity, became the work horse of applied trade analysis 
because of its generally good fit to bilateral trade and investment flows. Over 
the years the research agenda concentrated on improving the parameters 
estimation of the model and giving it a theoretical grounding and extended it 
to include a large array of variables that are thought to affect trade and 
investment flows
(5) Major improvements concentrated on increasing 
parameters efficiency in the presence of strong heterogeneity in the data and 
the absence of trade between some countries
(6). There is a vast theoretical and 
empirical literature on the gravity equation for trade and investment. Theories 
based on different foundations, including endowment and technological 
differences, increasing returns to scale, and “Armington” demands, all predict 
a gravity relationship for trade flows. See, for example, Anderson (1979), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), Helpman (1987), Feenstra (2002), and, 
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Davis (1995), Deardoff (1998), and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Haveman and Hummels (2001), Feenstra, 
et al (2001), and Eaton and Kortum (2001). The New Trade Theory (Helpman 
1987; Bergstrand 1990) as well as various other models, including Ricardian, 
Heckscher-Ohlin, and models of monopolistic competition with increasing 
returns to scale and product differentiation (Evenett and Keller 2002) provided 
theoretical foundations for taking into account further determinants.  
 
Country heterogeneity is better handled by panel data methods which 
have the advantage that they permit more flexible types of heterogeneity. This 
can be readily controlled for by means of country-pair and time effects both 
fixed and random. In early applications the absence of trade between some 
countries was ignored in the estimation because log linearization of the model 
is not defined for zero trade. This of course truncated the sample and 
introduced selection bias if the zeros are not randomly distributed, which is 
often the case. To overcome this problem some authors added a constant 
number to zero values arguing that it does not affect the quality of the 
estimation problems
(7). Others applied truncation methods in order to account 
for observation censoring
(8) in order to produce efficient estimates of the 
parameters. Some authors developed full maximum likelihood of the gravity 
model using a Poisson distribution of the errors
(9). The simplest method is to 
keep the log linearization while keeping zero flows in the data. This can be 
achieved by using the inverse hyperbolic sine function
(10) originally proposed 
  7by Johnston (1949) which is equivalent to the log function and in the same 
time defined for zero. This method does not truncate or eliminate low values 
of the dependent variable (Kritjansdottir, 2005) so it minimizes substantive 
changes to the distribution of the variable. In this paper we use this function in 
order to obtain a linear model. The matrix of inter Arab investment flows is 
very sparse and no investment flows represent more than two third of the total 
flows. We also compare the results with a model of investment decision by 
formulating a limited dependent Logit model.  
 
The standard gravity model assumes that investment flows   from 
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output in sender countries  , receiver country   and also by their respective 
populations   and  . The model is usually expressed in multiplicative 
form which simplify the process of linearization:.  This model is usually 
extended to include congruity and proximity dummy variables  to 
account for factors that facilitate trade and investment between countries such 
as border, language, colonial history, trade and investment treaties and 
conventions and trade blocks. This gravity model is augmented by a host of 
institutional and governance and policy induced variables in order to account 
for the quality of the investment environment that affect investment decisions. 
In order to simplify notation we represent the vector of gravity variables by 
 and the vector of variables capturing the quality of investment 
environment by  . The list of variables used in this paper for both matrices 
are given in Table 3. The  model is linearized as follows: 
it Y jt Y
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ijt ν  is a  heteroskedastic disturbance term with an expected conditional 
mean equal to one. Based on Haussman test it is common to treat  ij α  as fixed, 
which is equivalent to allowing each country pair to have its own dummy 
variable. However, due to introduced multicollinearity, cross section fixed 
effect  does  not permit to include distance in the model. 
 
There is vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the 
determinants of FDI. Eaton and Tamura (1994), provide an early application 
of the gravity model to FDI. In this literature gravity model is widely used for 
explaining bilateral FDI
(12). Martin and Rey (2004) proposed a theory of the 
gravity equation for bilateral investment flows. The common arguments for 
applying the model to FDI flows are based on the empirically observed 
complementarities between trade and FDI flows (Portes and Rey, 2005) and 
the notion that information asymmetries among other costs will increase with 
distance. Ghosh and Wolf (1999) proposed that trading relationships in 
addition to creating short run financial relationships also create long run 
supply and demand channels through which domestic enterprises can acquire 
foreign capital. Trading relationships provide information about host countries 
through growing familiarity, thereby reducing information costs of investing 
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emphasize the importance of fixed costs in making international investment 
decisions. Information costs are part of these fixed costs (Ghosh and Wolf, 
1999). A second argument made is based on familiarity effects that cause 
investors to favor countries that are closer and more similar to their own 
countries in terms of cultural affinity and linguistic characteristics. De Menil 
(1999) found that the gravity model accounted well for FDI flows among 
European countries This has been explained by a type of home bias due to the 
geographical proximity as well as similar languages and institutions. The 
finance literature offers some explanation for the home bias puzzle. Gehrig 
(1993) and Kang and Stulz (1997) derive home bias from asymmetric 
information between local and foreign investors. Tesar and Werner (1995) 
explain investment biases by “language, institutional and regulatory 
differences and the cost of obtaining information about foreign markets”. They 
suggest that geographical distance is an important consideration in 
international portfolio allocation decisions. Likewise Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) suggest that “economic distance” is the right concept for explaining 
investment bias. Martin and Rey (2004) develop a fully micro-founded general 
equilibrium model with optimizing agents and endogenous market 
capitalization. They were able to derive a gravity equation from their theory of 
asset trade.  
 
GDP size and GDP per capita are believed to give an indication of 
market size. The impact of GDP per capita on inward FDI is theoretically 
ambiguous. This is because high GDP per capita reflects both high purchasing 
power of consumers and high real wages. However empirical studies generally 
show GDP per capita to have a positive, although not always significant, 
impact on inward FDI. If FDI is increasing in market size, then both 
population and GDP could be expected to have positive signs. Both source and 
host country GDP are always estimated to be positive. However, source and 
host country population is almost always estimated to be negative. The level 
of development (measured by GDP per capita) is generally highly correlated 
with infrastructure Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that infrastructure of the 
developing countries is more important than market size. This may suggest 
that FDI flows to developing countries is vertical (endowment determined). 
The level of development of a country is a likely determinant of inward FDI, 
for several reasons. A large difference in GDP per capita between the source 
country and the host may reflect a difference in factor endowments, hence 
justify both trade and FDI between the two countries. Second, if  foreign firms 
are mainly interested by market access, then they will be attracted by both the 
size of the host country and by the purchasing power of its inhabitants, 
because high GDP per capita generally means some ground for product 
differentiation and higher profits. GDP per capita is also a measure of 
productivity and of real wages. Low GDP per capita entails low labor costs, 
which will act as an attraction factor. 
 
In most applications distance and proximity variables matter for FDI. 
These variables account for various transaction and informational costs 
incurred when investing abroad. Distance variable in gravity models not only 
reflects physical distance but also the familiarity effect. The cost of 
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the host country’s investment opportunities, customs and culture decreases. 
FDI flows exhibit strong signs of geographical concentration (see for example 
Eaton and Tamura (1994) Ghosh and Wolf (1998). They found distance 
elasticities have a negative sign and concluded that FDI relationship is 
stronger with countries that are nearby. Ghosh and Wolf (1999) argued that 
trade linkages provide information about the host countries,  Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) also argued that fixed costs are important in international 
investment decisions, and several authors emphasize at least part of the 
information cost is fixed (Ghosh and Wolf, 1999Goldstein and Razin (2002)).  
 
Theoretical literature mostly supports the view that institutional quality 
matters and that it should be positively related to inward FDI . However, 
empirical literature indicates that this is not yet a settled issue or a stylized 
fact. Poor institutions may bring additional costs to FDI. This can be the case 
of corruption for instance (Wei, 2000). Also due to high sunk costs, FDI is 
specially vulnerable to any form of uncertainty, including that stemming from 
poor government efficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak enforcement of 
property rights (Wheeler and Mody (1992), Wei (2000)). The impact of 
institutions on FDI has more recently been analyzed within the framework of 
gravity models. Levchenko (2004) suggests that institutional differences may 
be a source of comparative advantages. Aizenman and Spiegel (2002), by 
using a principal-agent framework argued that the share of FDI in total 
investment should be lower in countries with weak enforcement of property 
rights. However, ”psychic closeness” would reduce either perceived 
uncertainty or learning costs about the target countries. If institutions are 
dependent on economic and social history, then one could observe more FDI, 
amongst countries displaying relatively similar institutions. Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) have investigated the impact of institutional distance on 
bilateral FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that several risk factors such as 
bureaucratic red tape, political instability, corruption and the quality of the 
legal system are not significant explanatory factors for the location of US 
foreign affiliates. Wei (2000) finds that corruption significantly and adversely 
affects inward FDI. This result was later challenged by Stein and Daude 
(2001) who indicated that per capita GDP and corruption were highly 
collinear, so that leaving per capita GDP out of the estimated equation would 
lead to spurious results. They conclude that institutions do matter and that 
higher institutional quality positively affects inward FDI. Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) and Haussmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) argue that high 
quality institutions should have positive effects on both inward and outward. 
Egger and Winner (2006) studying the impact of corruption on FDI concluded 
that corruption is negatively and significantly related to FDI. Benassy-Quere, 
Coupet, and Mayer (2005) using multiple measures of institutional quality, 
find that higher quality institutions do matter and positively affect inward FDI. 
However when they examine institutional distance, they find that it is 
positively related to inward FDI. Before them Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
studied the impact of institutional distance on bilateral FDI, using corruption 
as a measure, and they find a negative relationship, which means the greater 
the difference in institutional quality, the more likely inward FDI is. 
 
  104. Highlights from the data  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 present variables sources and some summary 
statistics, respectively. The data include 15 host countries
(13) and 17
(14) source 
countries over 1998-2007 period. Thus, the number of observations is 
. Variables in Table 3 go from variables 
involved in the basic gravity specification to those involved in the augmented 
one.   
2400 ) 10 14 15 ( ) 10 15 2 ( = × × + × ×
 
Table 3: Data sources 
 
Variables Source 
Intraregional FDI flows  Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation
















Distance, Border, Language CEPII 
Trade UNCTAD 
GDP growth rate  WDI, World Bank 
Economic Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Investment 
freedom, Business freedom and Financial freedom 
Economic freedom of the world, annual 
report by CATO Institute 
ICRG PRS  Group 
Control of corruption, Political stability and 
regulatory quality  World Bank 





































The Arab region is very heterogeneous in terms of economic and social 
development as well as in terms of market size and the quality of the business 
environment. Income per capita varies from high income level GCC countries 
of  Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE to low income level in Mauritania, 
Sudan and Yemen. It varies from 80000 US$ to just 385 US$. Most Arab 
economies are classified as lower middle income.  In terms of distance Arab 
countries stretches by more than 6300 Km from Baghdad  to Nouakchott and 
as close by 85 Km between Manama and Doha. In terms of market size Egypt 
is the largest in term of population accounting for more than 22% of total Arab 
population in 2006. In fact six Arab countries account for more than 70% of 
population. In terms of GDP Saudi Arabia alone account for more than 26 5 of 
total Arab GDP in 2007, and only six countries account form nearly 70 % of 
total Arab GDP in the same year. As noted above the status of infrastructure is 
linked to the level of economic development. The results from the composite 
index we computed and based on 13 sub indices show that GCC countries 
have the highest scores whereas poor Arab countries have the lowest scores. 
UAE score was 67 index points compared to 7.4 for Sudan. Most Arab non 
Gulf countries need to upgrade infrastructure in order to improve their 
business environments. 
  
In terms  of the assessment of quality of institutions the paper uses a 
large array of  indices that reflects different facets of the business and 
investment environment and potential risks for the investors. ICRG investment 
profile index which summarizes potential expropriation risks shows that such 
risks are limited and only Egypt, Syria and Sudan and Iraq scored below 8 out 
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investors, the index of investment freedom taken from the Economic Freedom 
index published by House of Fraser shows that most Arab countries have a 
relatively restrictive investment environments. The restrictions are highest in 
Qatar, UAE, KSA, Lebanon, Tunisia, Syria and Libya. Freedom of investment 
is highest in Morocco and Mauritania. The rest of Arab countries have average 
scores. Arab countries try to overcome such restrictive regulatory framework 
by establishing special laws and procedure such as the unified window in 
order to cut down red tape and to enact FDI bilateral investment treaties and 
avoid double imposition. GCC countries do not levy taxes on GCC citizens 
and are in the process of establishing a common market. Dummy variables for 
bilateral investment and fiscal treaties were coded as one for GCC intra FDI. 
Arab countries made progress in generalizing such treaties between them, 
however investment treaties coven only 45 % of possible bilateral conventions 
and only 32 % for fiscal treaties.   
 
Table 4: Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Log FDI   5.580798 7.781682  0  24.04625 
Sinh
-1 (FDI)  5.813825 8.104329  0  24.7394 
Log Distance  7.52364 0.82891  4.453665  8.761646 
Log GDP  48.27769 1.256026  45.48945  52.1866 
Log GDP per capita  16.38858 1.837968  12.09216  21.98793 
GDP growth rate   4.99338 3.268615  -4.339 17.723 
Log  Population  31.89068 1.854063  26.5924  35.60681 
Total  Trade  17.06757  3.484856  0.693147  22.37977 
Economic Freedom  57.34953  10.98425  31.53  76.3 
Business Freedom  63.3098 12.97684  20  85 
Financial Freedom  42.46667 20.10184  10  90 
Investment Freedom  44.26667 16.22463  10  70 
Fiscal Freedom  78.136 18.53596 32.3  99.9 
ICRG (Investment Profile Index)  8.747326 1.806241  3  11.5 
Control of corruption   2.936711 0.661078  1.633694  4.17946 
Political stability   2.580206 0.909491  0.61368  4.034574 
Regulatory quality   2.772289 0.719608  0.804803  4.072647 
Infrastructure  34.60746 13.24502  6.005341  66.95997 
GCC sender dummy  0.162917 0.369367  0  1 
Fiscal treaties dummy  0.425417 0.494509  0  1 
Investment treaties dummy  0.5675 0.495526  0  1 
Common borer dummy   0.1625 0.368986  0  1 
Common language dummy  0.541667 0.498365  0  1 
 
We used World bank governance indicators in order to assess the 
quality of Arab institutional framework. The data show that Arab countries in 
general suffer from a weak regulatory framework, widespread corruption, and  
low level of political stability. These indicators reflect the syndrome of a risk 
prone region that inhibit foreign investors despite the investment opportunities 
of the region. As far as political stability only 6 Arab countries had positive 
values of the index out of 17 Arab countries. Rule of law situation is better 
with 8 countries having positive scores, however for corruption and regulatory 
framework only seven countries had positive scores in 2007.  Countries that 
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Qatar, Tunisia, and the UAE. It is clear that the quality of the institutional 
framework is a big handicap for FDI inflows to the Arab region. 
 
A dummy variable named GCC sender is added to account for the 
importance of GCC countries as FDI source block. Fiscal and investment 
treaties are dummy variables as well, taking 1 if a treaty exists between two 
countries and 0 otherwise, added in order to account for the effectiveness of 
such treaties in enhancing bilateral investment. Two other dummy variables 
are added to assess the importance of common language and border in 
explaining bilateral investment. Obviously, the common language means the 
second common one after Arabic and it reflects a same colonial history which 
leads to common business and legislation language. Table 4 shows that 
variables accounting for economic fiscal, investment,  business and financial 
freedom vary much. Similarly, infrastructure variable shows a high standard 
deviation confirming relevant differences between host countries. Inversely, 
ICRG, accounting for country investment risk, control of corruption political 
stability and regulatory quality variables do not vary much. 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
Based on the model presented in section 3 above we run numerous 
regressions  of  the basic, extended and augmented gravity model using panel 
fixed cross section and time effects. We also estimated the selected models 
using limited dependent panel logit model in order to determine the factors 
that help explain the probability of observing investment flows between Arab 
countries. The correlation table given in the Appendix E below shows that pair 
wise correlations between the explanatory do not pose a potential problem of 
multicollinearity. It is well documented in the literature that the level of 
development is highly correlated with the level of institutional development. 
So dropping GDP per capita from the model would produced spurious 
regression. In fact the level of correlation between governance indicators and 
GDP per capita in the sample does not exceed 50 %.  The empirical results of 
the selected models are summarized in Appendixes C and D. Regression 1 
(Model 1) with no country-pair dummies shows that the basic gravity 
specification works relatively well in terms of parameters significance, but 
with low goodness of fit, explaining over 13% of the variation in bilateral FDI. 
Simple gravity model produces the expected results when compared to other 
application using this model in which GDP, and Distance and population are 
significant with the correct signs. Thus, bilateral FDI inflows increases with 
economic size, as measured by GDP, and decreases in distance. However, 
GDP per capita  is negatively related to FDI inflows. Thus, FDI seems to be 
positively driven by the total wealth and negatively driven by the average 
wealth of host countries. This is so in the context of Arab countries because 
sender countries are the wealthiest and small in population and are the least 
recipient of FDI except probably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Country-pair 
fixed affect when introduced in the equation (Model 2) produces similar result 
whereby GDP, GDP per capita and population are significant with the same 
signs. However the explanatory power of the model increase dramatically to 
45%.  Given the erratic behavior of Arab intraregional FDI inflows country 
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factors that have a bearing on FDI allocation such as political factors between 
Arab states. On the other hand time dummies do not contribute significantly in 
the explanatory power of the model. The basic gravity model was extended 
(model 3) to include GDP growth, Common business language, Common 
border and trade. The result indicates that these variables are significant and 
the explanatory power of the model increased to 47%. Host countries GDP 
growth is shown to be negatively related to FDI inflows. An interpretation of 
this unexpected result is that investors jump on good opportunities, regarding 
the sector and its profitability, driven by the last wave of privatization.   
Moreover, common language dummy affects FDI negatively and significantly 
FDI inflows probably because most of the FDI inflows are operated between 
the same business language countries.  This dummy variable was coded  on a 
second common language given that Arabic is common to all Arab countries. 
This variable is used to take into account the level of proximity of source and 
host countries sharing the same colonial history which in part influences 
common business and legislation language. The result means that different 
second language is not seen as a constraint. Sharing a land border positively 
affect bilateral FDI inflows, which concurs with the negative impact of 
distance on FDI. This is also confirmed by the positive and significant impact 
of GCC sender dummy variable. GCC sender variable takes one when the 
source country is one of the six GCC countries. Its positive and significant 
coefficient indicates that GCC countries are the largest investors. In fact this 
dummy account for a large variations of FDI inflows and has the same 
explanatory power of the country fixed effect dummies. This extended gravity 
model indicates that proximity factors plays a significant role in bilateral FDI 
flows. Total trade was also found to have a positive significant impact. Intra 
trade affects FDI either through the information and familiarity of doing 
channel, or by  investing  abroad to overcome trade barriers and exploit local 
markets. We noticed that imports and exports when taken separately have 
insignificant impact on bilateral FDI. Only total trade which is the sum of both 
variables has significant impact on bilateral FDI, indicating that higher trade, 
without being able to say in which direction, leads to more investment.  
 
Base of the theoretical and empirical evidence surveyed in section 3, 
the extended gravity model was further augmented to include factors that are 
believed to have influence on bilateral FDI inflows. In model 4 we test the 
pertinence of an open liberal economic environment to bilateral trade. Using 
economic freedom indices developed by the CATO institute, we added to 
models 3 variables that measure economic, financial, fiscal, business and 
investment freedoms. First investment freedom index has a positive impact on 
bilateral FDI in the Arab region. However other measures of economic 
freedom have a negative impact. Then how to account for such a 
contradiction.  In model 5 also the aggregate measure of economic freedom 
and ICRG's investment profile are shown to negatively affect bilateral FDI.  
This result is probably due that Arab government make specific reforms in 
certain areas that are thought by policy makers as essential to stimulate 
development whereas in other areas the reforms are slow.  Also some 
countries have FDI laws that are liberal whereas domestic regulation is very 
tight in other areas. However, the results shows that concentrating reforms in 
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go to areas where economic freedom is low. The significance confirms at least 
that they do matter, as we said before, but in the wrong way, since we thought 
or wished their impact would be positive. Thus, the economic environment as 
a whole hampers investment. We think that this does not mean that there is no 
improvement in business environment but the rhythm with which reforms are 
currently undertaken does not correspond to that of bilateral FDI (calculating 
growth rates of these indices over 1998-2007 period confirms this idea, except 
few examples of deep improvements for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar in terms of 
financial freedom, or Sudan, Syria and Libya in terms of fiscal freedom). In 
addition, ICRG is shown to negatively affect bilateral FDI. Given that ICRG 
reflects investment risk, the result concurs with the one above and tells a lot 
about the necessity of fostering reforms in order to deeply and quickly 
improve the economic environment and lower investment risk in some 
countries.  
 
As for infrastructure variable, model 6 shows that it impacts negatively 
and significantly bilateral FDI, indicating that more investment flows are 
allocated to countries with bad infrastructure. This is related to the nature of  
intra-Arab investments widely concentrated in services, telecommunications, 
real estate and tourism driven mainly by lack of infrastructure and hence 
represent an opportunity offered by government aiming to upgrade 
infrastructure. This finding merely confirms the negative relationship between 
FDI and GDP growth rate discussed above.  
 
In model 6 we test the impact of institutional variables that are thought 
to reflect the quality of business and investment environment and the different 
risks that investors encounter. We used World Bank governance indicators 
that benchmark political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory 
framework. Both political stability and control of corruption are found to be 
negatively and significantly related to FDI. This result also reflect the fact that 
Arab intraregional FDI occurs between countries with low level of institutions, 
because some of the investments are made by government investment agencies 
or  because simply investors do not see potential threats because themselves 
operates in bad institutional environments. However regulatory quality is 
found to be positively significant related to FDI.   
 
Finally, investment and fiscal treaties added to model 6 are found to be 
negatively related to bilateral FDI. These variables are coded as dummies if 
the pair of countries have a common investment and tax treaty. Tax treaties 
variable is not significant, however  investment  treaties variable is significant 
and also negative. This result means that treaties are not effective tools of 
investment promotion as FDI flows to countries without such treaties       
  
6. Conclusion  
 
Foreign Direct Investment has increased dramatically in the global 
economy over the past twenty years, though this recent surge has affected 
advanced countries as well as some Asian countries to a much greater extent 
than Arab countries. Simultaneously, some Arab countries, mainly GCC 
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of liquidity driven by high oil prices and repatriated Arab money since 
September 11. Therefore, the need to draw up an assessment of the global 
evolution of Arab intraregional FDI in order to reap its benefits on Arab 
countries is highlighted using an augmented gravity model based on standard 
variables as well as a set of specific variables accounting for institutional and 
regulatory aspects using a panel data of 17 Arab countries over 1998-2007 
period.  
 
Empirical evidence stresses the importance of economic size, as 
measured by GDP, and distance in explaining FDI flows, which increase in 
GDP and decrease in distance. Inversely, GDP per capita and population 
negatively affect FDI bilateral flows, suggesting that bilateral FDI seems to be 
positively driven by total wealth and negatively driven by the average wealth 
of host countries. Furthermore, bilateral FDI flows are likely to be larger 
between neighbors, having already well established trade movements. 
 
Empirical evidence on quality business environment, as measured by 
business, fiscal, economic, financial and investment environment, is quite 
mixed, but suggests that regulatory constraints in Arab countries tend to 
hamper bilateral investment. Likewise, relative investment profile risk, as 
measured by ICRG index, and low institutional quality, as measured by 
political stability and control of corruption, are found to negatively affect 
bilateral FDI flows. Evidence supports the idea that countries suffering the 
most from weak regulatory framework and widespread corruption attract, with 
no surprise, less FDI inflows. Inversely, differences in second language and 
infrastructure levels are found to positively affect bilateral FDI, indicating that 
different business languages is not seen as a constraint, and larger FDI flows 
are allocated to countries with bad infrastructure, revealing the nature of Arab 
FDI flows widely concentrated in services, telecommunications and real 
estate.  
 
Finally, Arab generalizing efforts in terms of investment and fiscal 
treaties are shown to be, so far, not effective in boosting bilateral FDI flows 
contrary to host countries hopes. Besides gravity variables, normally affecting 
intraregional FDI, institutional quality and other variables are not in favor of 
intraregional FDI, indicating that there is room for improvement. Indeed, in 
order to achieve more effective intraregional FDI, more efforts have to be 
undertaken in terms of improving business environment, controlling 
corruption, limiting risks as well as deepening cooperation policies. Such 
efforts will certainly enhance Arab countries attractiveness in eyes of Arab 
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(1)  See Laabas (2002) and  Noland and Pack (2007) for a discussion of economic 
development challenges facing Arab countries. 
(2)  GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) 
(3)  To the best of our knowledge, there are few empirical comparative studies on Inter Arab 
Investment flows. Elafif  (2006)  used a model to study Arab intraregional investment 
flows, however the model specification was adhoc. 
(4)  The countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,  Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen. 
(5)  researchers have various specifications of factor endowment of  countries as well as 
transaction-cost-related variables, such as common language, common border, general 
openness of destination country to foreign competition, etc. What is called “gravity 
model”, therefore, often goes beyond the core idea of such models, namely to take into 
account the size of the economies concerned and their distance.  
(6)  For example Joseph Francois and Miriam Manchin (2007) found that 42% of importer-
exporter pairings had zero bilateral trade. Helpman and Melitz (2007) used a data set on 
158 countries whereby about half of the country pairs do not trade with one-another.  
(7)  By assuming that Ln(FDI+a) and  using a = 1 allows setting to zero the dependent 
variable when FDI is zero. However it would substantially compress the distribution of 
FDI. Alternative  Benassay et al (2006)  used  a = 0..3, which corresponds to the first 
decile of the distribution. 
(8)  Helpman et al. (2005) proposed a theoretical model rationalizing the zero trade flows and 
suggest estimating the gravity equation with a correction for the probability of countries 
to trade. To estimate the model they apply a two-step estimation technique similar to 
sample selection models. Will Martin and Cong Pham (2007) applied Eaton-Tamura (E-
T) Tobit estimator to a gravity model. 
(9)  See for example Westerlundy and Fredrik Wilhelmssonz (2006) who estimated the gravity 
model directly from its non-linear form by using the fixed effects Poisson maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimator that was first proposed by Hausman et al. (1984). 
(10) The inverse hyperbolic sine function is defined as follows 
] ) .  1 ( [
2 / 1 2 1 x x Ln Sinh + + =
−
(11) 
(1) Clair, G., G. Gaulier, T. Mayer, and S. Zignago (2004). “Notes on CEPII’s distances 
measures.” CEPII: Paris.  
 
(12) See for example  Hausman and Fernandez-Arias , 2000, Chunlai, 1997, De Menil, 1999, 
Portes and Rey, 2000, Portes et al, 2001 and Wei, 1997, 2000. 
(13) Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. 
(14) Same countries plus Iraq and Kuwait. 
(15) Air transport, freight (million ton-km), Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 100 
people), International Internet bandwidth (bits per person),  International voice traffic 
(minutes per person), Internet users (per 100 people),  Mobile phone subscribers (per 100 
people),  Personal computers (per 100 people), Population covered by mobile telephony 
(%),Price basket for residential fixed line (US$ per month), Roads, paved (% of total 
roads), Secure Internet servers (per 1 million people), Telephone faults (per 100 
mainlines) and Telephone mainlines (per 100 people). 
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Appendix A: Total FDI inflows in Arab countries (US Dollars  
at current prices in millions) 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Saudi
Arabia 94.00  123.00  183.00  504.00  453.00  778.46  1942.00  12097.00  18293.00  24318.40  
UAE 257.66  -985.34  -506.33  1183.84  1314.27  4255.96  10003.54  10899.93  12805.99  13253.12  
Egypt 1075.50  1065.30  1235.40  509.90  646.90  237.40  2157.40  5375.60  10042.80  11578.10  
Lebanon 1134.90  871.68  964.10  1451.22  1335.96  2977.00  1993.10  2791.47  2739.40  2844.56  
Morocco 400.29  1363.92  422.21  2807.73  481.30  2314.49  894.78  1653.37  2450.30  2577.08  
Libya -148.00  -128.10  141.00  -113.00  145.00  143.00  357.00  1038.00  2013.00  2541.00  
Sudan 370.70  370.80  392.21  574.00  713.18  1349.19  1511.07  2304.64  3541.36  2436.34  
Oman 101.44  39.01  83.20  5.20  122.24  494.15  228.87  1687.90  1622.90  2377.10  
Jordan 310.01  156.40  814.81  179.84  121.58  443.16  816.36  1774.05  3219.32  1835.40  
Bahrain 179.52  453.72  363.56  80.40  217.02  516.70  865.31  1048.67  2914.89  1756.00  
Algeria 606.60  291.70  438.00  1196.00  1065.00  633.80  881.90  1081.30  1795.40  1664.60  
Tunisia 668.10  367.90  778.80  486.40  821.30  583.90  638.90  782.40  3311.80  1617.90  
Qatar 347.30  113.25  251.60  295.52  623.92  624.92  1198.97  1298.23  158.98  1137.99  
Syria 82.00  263.00  270.00  110.00  115.00  180.00  275.00  500.00  600.00  885.00  
Yemen -219.40  -307.60  6.40  135.50  101.70  5.50  143.60  -302.10  1121.00  464.27  
Iraq 7.11  -6.90  -3.14  -6.45  -1.59  -0.02  300.00  515.30  383.00  447.89  
Djibouti 3.45  4.24  3.29  3.35  3.50  14.22  38.54  59.04  163.59  195.35  
Mauritania -0.30  15.12  40.10  76.70  67.40  101.89  391.60  814.10  154.57  152.88  
Somalia 0.04  -0.81  0.27  0.04  0.14  -0.85  -4.79  24.00  96.00  141.00  
Kuwait 59.06  72.28  16.30  -175.00  3.62  -68.00  23.75  234.00  122.00  123.00  
Palestine 218.20  188.60  62.00  19.20  9.40  18.00  48.90  46.50  18.60  20.86  
Comoros 0.38  0.27  0.09  1.15  0.43  0.79  0.67  0.56  0.58  0.80  
 
Source : Unctad database, 2008.  
 
  25Appendix B: Total FDI outflows of Arab countries (US Dollars  
at current prices in millions)  
 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
Kuwait -1866.86  22.99  -303.14  -242  -78  -5016  2581  5142.12  8207  14203  
Saudi 
Arabia 140.64  97.38  1550  39.28  2020.02  473  78.389  52.858  1257.40  13139.11  
UAE 127.30  317.10  423.66  213.70  412.67  991.15  2208.03  3750.30  10891.76  6624.73  
Qatar 21.42  7.19  17.74  17.21  -21.04  88.17  437.918  351.91  127.43  5262.60  
Bahrain 180.8  163.4  9.57  215.95  190.15  741.35  1035.63  1135.37  980.05  1669.14  
Egypt 45.5  37.5  51.2  12.4  27.8  20.7  158.9  92  148.4  664.8  
Morocco 20.36  17.84  58.55  97.07  28.36  12.20  30.80  73.55412  444.91  652.14  
Oman -4.73  3.39  -2  54.99  0.026  153.44  249.67  234.1  327.7  569.6  
Algeria 1  47  18  9  99.8  14.2  257.9  22.5  34.6  289.9  
Lebanon 37.83  131.73  108.37  1.19  0.20  40  212.9  122.04  70.01  232.9  
Iraq ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  88.7  305  147.15  
Palestine 81.83  86.58  218.14  363.69  346.15  48.5  -11.49  40.38  139.18  56.02  
Syria 1  20  43.08  8.94  119.40  57.10  47.54  61.23  55.29  54.69  
Yemen 4.00  -3.99  -8.76  0.60  39.34  61.41  21.48  65.03  55.91  53.83  
Jordan 2.054  2.7  8.60  31.59  13.82  -3.66  18.19  163.18  -138.08  48.09  
Tunisia 1.8  2.5  0.4  5.8  6.5  5.4  4.2  12.6  33.1  20.07  
Sudan ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  7.28  10.74  
Mauritania 0.09275  ..  ..  ..  ..  -1  4  2.02  5.07  3.75  
Libya 295  226  98  -174.6  -136  62.6  -286  128  -534  -479  
 
Source : Unctad database, 2008.  
  26Appendix C: Panel Least Squares Gravity model results  (dependant variable Sinh
-1(FDI))   
Variables   Model 1  Model  2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant  -58.95*** 52.6***  6.36  5.81  4.08  -5.28 
  (-8.95) (5.49) (1.12) (1.01) (0.73) (-0.93) 
Ln GDP  32.48*** 24.69***  0.1  0.3***  0.31***  0.49*** 
 (4.24)  (3.05)  (0.80)  (2.51)  (2.68)  (3.88) 
Ln GDP per capita  -31.12***  -24.77***         
 (-4.07)  (-3.06)        
Ln Distance  -2.4***    -1.15***  -1.76*** -1.6*** -1.65*** 
 (-12.61)    (-5.61) (-10.22)  (-9.54)  (-7.81) 
Ln Population  -30.58***  -40.96***         
 (-4.00)  (-4.77)        
GDP growth      -0.14***  -0.12***  -0.11***   
     (-3.94) (-3.38)  (-2.9)   
Common language    -0.57**      -0.48* 
     (-2.14)     (-1.83) 
Common border      2.11***      1.39*** 
     (4.48)     (3.00) 
GCC sender      13.51***  13.07***  13.17***  12.88***
     (54.68) (52.22)  (53.84)  (49.40) 
Trade     0.1**  0.11***  0.13***  0.13*** 
     (2.33) (2.73)  (3.06)  (3.14) 
Economic freedom        -0.05***   
        (-4.98)   
Financial freedom        -0.02***     
      (-2.46)    
Fiscal freedom        -0.02**     
      (-2.43)    
Business freedom        -0.03***     
      (-3.05)    
Investment freedom      0.04***     
      (5.01)    
Infrastructure           -0.09*** 
         (-5.69) 
Political stability            -0.44* 
         (-1.67) 
Regulatory quality            1.63*** 
         (4.38) 
ICRG      -0.24***  -0.2**   
      (-2.82) (-2.29)   
Control of corruption          -1.37** 
         (-2.17) 
Investment treaties          -0.72** 
         (-2.54) 
Fiscal treaties            -0.068 
         (-0.23) 
Observations 2400  2400  2400  2400  2400  2400 
Adjusted R-squared  0.13  0.45  0.47  0.48  0.47  0.50 
F statistic  29.63 8.98  134.79  119.28  137  116.61 
Prob(F stat)  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Country Pair Dummies  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hausman test: Chi-Sq (FE verses RE)    41.15         
T-statistic of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 [percent, respectively. 
  27Appendix D: Panel Logit Gravity model results  (dependant variable Sinh
-1(FDI))   
Variables  Model 1  Model  2  Model  3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant -16.66***  -21.28***  -10.26*  0.78  -6.42  -10.32* 
  (-3.95) (-4.96) (-1.87) (0.14) (-1.17) (-1.72) 
Log GDP  19.33***  19.45***  0.2*  0.08  0.21*  0.27** 
  (2.73) (2.78) (1.74) (0.68) (1.88) (2.10) 
Log GDP per capita  -19.06***  -19.16***         
  (-2.69)  (-2.74)      
Log Distance  -0.96***    -0.46*  -0.82***  -0.76***  -0.53** 
  (-5.96)  (-1.98)  (-4.4)  (-4.0)  (-2.29) 
Log Population   -18.76***  -18.28         
  (-2.65) (-2.71)      
GDP growth       -0.03  -0.07**  -0.05**   
     (-1.47) (-2.46) (-2.11)   
Common language      -0.24    -0.13 
    (-0.78)    (-0.44) 
Common  border     1.03*    0.97* 
    (2.06)    (1.96 
GCC sender       26.31  26.57  26.37  26.74 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trade       0.094***  0.08**  0.1***  0.083** 
     (2.71) (2.30) (2.83) (2.30) 
Economic freedom           -0.06***   
       (-5.11)   
Financial  freedom       -0.03***    
       (-5.14)    
Fiscal freedom         -0.003     
       (-0.5)    
Business freedom         -0.04***     
       (-4.54)    
Investment freedom         0.02***     
       (3.38)    
Infrastructure          -0.02 
        (-1.41) 
Political  stability          -0.3 
        (-1.45) 
Regulatory  quality          0.95** 
        (2.51) 
ICRG         0.17***  0.19***  
       (2.61) (3.16)   
Control  of  corruption          -1.23*** 
        (-2.9) 
Investment  treaties          -0.09 
        (-0.37) 
Fiscal  treaties          0.32 
        (1.19) 
Observations   2400  2400  2400 2400 2400 2400 
 Wald chi2  68.7  32.93  41.2  93.78  62.57  71.81 
Prob > chi2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Country Pair Dummies   No   Yes  No   No   No   No  
Year Dummies   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Hausman test: Chi-Sq 
(FE verses RE) 
 6.62        
Prob>chi2    0.084      
 
Z-statistic of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels at 
1, 5 and 10 [percent, respectively. 
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